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MABUX ARA LNG Bunker Index
Port LNG$/mton MGO LS$/mton Date
ARA
1 449.00
+93.00
1 370.00
+20.00
Sep 7
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Port	LNG$/mton	MGO LS$/mton	Date
ARA	1 449.00	+93.00	1 370.00	+20.00	Sep 7

MABUX Global Bunker Index

380HSFO$/mton		VLS FO$/mton		MGO LS$/mton		Date
651.72	+5.65	817.77	+4.58	1 447.05	+9.97	Sep 8

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MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI)

Correlation between market bunker prices (MBP) and MABUX Digital Bunker Price Benchmark (DBP)

All Indexes in $/mton	380HSFO			VLS FO			MGO LS			Date
All Indexes in $/mton	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	Date
Rotterdam	585	674	-89	690	761	-71	1 370	1 613	-243	Sep 8
Singapore	640	706	-66	845	867	-22	1 247	1 606	-359	Sep 8
Fujairah	645	656	-11	850	808	+42	1 450	1 669	-219	Sep 8
Houston	523	675	-152	725	798	-73	1 315	1 484	-169	Sep 8

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Latest News
- 2026-09-08
  Oil rises as risks of prolonged Mideast conflict heighten supply worries
  Oil prices extended gains on Tuesday as risks of a prolonged conflict in the Middle East grew after Iran threatened to retaliate against any new U.S. attacks on its assets, heightening worries over supply disruption. Brent crude futures climbed 34... Read more Oil prices extended gains on Tuesday as risks of a prolonged conflict in the Middle East grew after Iran threatened to retaliate against any new U.S. attacks on its assets, heightening worries over supply disruption.
  
  Brent crude futures climbed 34 cents, or 0.35%, to $97.34 a barrel by 0000 GMT. U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude was at $92.63 a barrel, up $1.15, or 1.26%.
  
  Brent rose to its highest level since July 24 in the previous session, as traders continued to build a risk premium into prices amid heightened tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global crude shipments.
  
  Iran warned on Monday that energy infrastructure across the Gulf, including U.S. oil and gas interests, was vulnerable. This follows tit-for-tat strikes during the weekend, with no sign of progress towards a diplomatic breakthrough.
  
  On Saturday, U.S. forces struck three Iranian oil tankers, including one near Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export hub, according to U.S. Central Command. The attacks followed strikes by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards on U.S. warships operating in the region.
  
  "The recent escalation of the Middle East conflict has increased the likelihood of a prolonged standoff, punctuated by calibrated military action by the U.S. and Iran. This could see Persian Gulf supply remain constrained through the rest of 2026," Daniel Hynes, an analyst at ANZ, said in a note.
  
  "We don’t expect a full return to pre-war throughput until late Q1 or early Q2 2027."
  
  MARKET OUTLOOK
  
  Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs raised its Brent and WTI price forecasts by $5 to $85 and $80, respectively, for December 2026 and to $80 and $75, respectively, for 2027, reflecting its new assumption that Middle East shipping disruptions continue into 2027.
  
  In financial services platform Marex’s September commodity outlook, analyst Ed Meir said that as long as the war continues, which it thinks it will given "the multitude of issues that have yet to be addressed", crude oil prices will likely remain elevated through year-end. Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2026-09-08
  Why isn’t oil above $100 despite supply disruptions?
  Global oil benchmark Brent crude has rallied this month but stayed below $100 a barrel despite recent escalation in the U.S.-Iran conflict that has disrupted Gulf exports from the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Crude oil shipments from Middle East... Read more Global oil benchmark Brent crude has rallied this month but stayed below $100 a barrel despite recent escalation in the U.S.-Iran conflict that has disrupted Gulf exports from the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
  
  Crude oil shipments from Middle East producers are at about 11 million barrels per day (bpd) now, from 18 million bpd before the Iran war began seven months ago, according to Argus.
  
  Here are some of the factors driving oil prices:
  
  SIGNIFICANT VOLUMES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FLOW THROUGH HORMUZ
  
  In the week before fighting erupted again on August 30, roughly 8 million to 9 million bpd had been flowing through Hormuz, double the previous week’s volume, said Rystad Energy’s Chief Economist Claudio Galimberti.
  
  While flows have since fallen to below 2 million bpd, the daily moving average is still around 4 million to 5 million barrels which puts Brent at a "fair" price of $95, Galimberti said. Industry estimates put daily exports between 6 million and 8 million barrels.
  
  There has been no visible very large crude carrier exiting the strait since September 2, Kpler data showed on Monday.
  
  During the interim U.S.-Iran peace deal in July, Hormuz exports touched pre-war levels of 16 million bpd.
  
  GULF EXPORTERS ARE USING ALTERNATIVE ROUTES AND MEANS
  
  Gulf producers have found alternative routes and are expected to continue sending cargoes for ship-to-ship transfers outside of Hormuz, mitigating some of the earlier shortfall.
  
  Saudi Aramco resumed loadings from its Ras Tanura port inside the Gulf in August, although its exports from Yanbu in the Red Sea remain under pressure from a naval blockade by the Iran-aligned Yemeni Houthis. Yanbu exports hit a six-month low of 1.429 million bpd in August, from an average of 3.9 million bpd in the previous three months, provisional Kpler data showed.
  
  Exports from the alternative port of Egypt’s Sidi Kerir hit 2.139 million bpd in August, more than double June volumes.
  
  Exports from No. 2 OPEC producer Iraq rebounded in August to around 2.34 million bpd.
  
  Shipments from the United Arab Emirates hovered around 2.9 million bpd in August and July after hitting a record in June, Kpler data showed.
  
  Kuwaiti crude exports have recovered to about 1 million bpd in July and August.
  
  However, Iran’s oil exports have fallen sharply due to the U.S. blockade.
  
  OTHER PRODUCERS ARE STEPPING UP
  
  Non-OPEC producers including the U.S., Canada and Guyana are set to increase output by a combined 1.4 million bpd this year, according to Jarand Rystad, founder of Rystad Energy, partly filling the shortfall.
  
  Meanwhile, Russian crude exports held steady at about 5.5 million bpd in July and August, down from the 6.4 million bpd peak in June, but still 23% higher than February as processing at Russian refineries has fallen due to damage to Russian plants from Ukrainian attacks, Kpler data showed.
  
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  However, Russia has downgraded its 2026 oil output forecast to a 17-year low, which may reduce its exports.
  
  DEMAND DESTRUCTION IS SIGNIFICANT
  
  Demand destruction in petrochemicals and transportation fuels remains significant in the third quarter at 3.5 million bpd, versus 4.5 million bpd in the second quarter, with China accounting for more than half of that due to rising transport electrification and coal-based chemicals, Rystad said.
  
  Top importer China, dubbed the "new demand OPEC" for its market influence, slashed seaborne crude shipments to 7 million bpd in July and August, from over 11 million bpd in February.
  
  Beijing’s vast reserves, estimated by Kpler at 1.17 billion barrels, have also given markets comfort.
  
  PHYSICAL MARKETS TELL A DIFFERENT STORY
  
  Spot premiums have rebounded to April levels with Dubai and Oman at $19 to $20 a barrel above Dubai quotes for cargoes loading in November, Reuters data showed. Oman futures were at $104.54 a barrel on Monday while cash Dubai traded at $105.10 a barrel.
  
  "At the moment, it’s telling us that physically things are incredibly tight," said David Fyfe, chief economist at Argus.
  
  "We’ve already got prices substantially above $100 a barrel and even more important, you’ve got a diesel market that is screaming shortage."
  
  The recent U.S.-Iran escalation is expected to curb Gulf exports while demand rises as refiners ramp output of diesel, which has hit a record high price in the U.S.
  
  ANALYSTS LIFT FORECASTS
  
  Several banks have raised their Brent price forecasts, including Morgan Stanley which expects prices averaging $100 a barrel in the fourth quarter.
  
  Goldman Sachs raised its Brent and West Texas Intermediate forecasts by $5 a barrel for December 2026 and 2027, citing an expectation that Middle East shipping disruptions will persist into next year. It now forecasts Brent at $85 a barrel and WTI at $80 for December 2026, and 2027 prices at $80 and $75 a barrel, respectively. Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2026-09-08
  MABUX: Global bunker market expected to extend gains on Sep. 08 amid renewed US-Iran attacks and elevated volatility.
  The MABUX World Bunker Index — a composite benchmark reflecting daily prices for 380 HSFO, VLSFO, and MGO – edged higher on Sep. 07: 380 HSFO: USD/MT: 646.07 (+2.85) VLSFO: USD/MT: 813.19 (+3.96) MGO: USD/MT: 1 437.08 (+1.57) As of Sep. 08, the... Read more The MABUX World Bunker Index — a composite benchmark reflecting daily prices for 380 HSFO, VLSFO, and MGO – edged higher on Sep. 07:
  
  380 HSFO: USD/MT: 646.07 (+2.85)
  VLSFO: USD/MT: 813.19 (+3.96)
  MGO: USD/MT: 1 437.08 (+1.57)
  
  As of Sep. 08, the MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI), which tracks the spread between Market Bunker Prices (MBP) and the MABUX Digital Bunker Benchmark (DBP), indicated the following trends across the four major global bunkering hubs—Rotterdam, Singapore, Fujairah, and Houston:
  
  • HSFO segment: All four ports remained underpriced. The MDI discount narrowed by $2 in Rotterdam and $4 in Houston, while widening by $8 in Singapore and $4 in Fujairah. Houston’s MDI stayed above the $100 threshold.
  
  • VLSFO segment: Fujairah continued to be the only overpriced port, with its premium narrowing by $2. Singapore shifted into the underpriced zone, joining Rotterdam and Houston. MDI discounts narrowed by $4 in Rotterdam, $10 in Singapore, and $4 in Houston.
  
  Relatively minor MDI changes in the HSFO and VLSFO segments suggest that price imbalances for these fuel grades are showing signs of stabilization.
  
  • MGO LS segment: All four ports remained underpriced, although MDI discounts narrowed sharply — by $50 in Rotterdam, $31 in Singapore, $32 in Fujairah, and $20 in Houston. MDI values remained well above the $100 threshold across all four hubs.
  
  The global bunker market is expected to extend its upward movement on Sep. 08, supported by renewed US-Iran attacks and elevated market volatility. At the same time, price dynamics are likely to remain uneven across fuel grades and regional hubs:
  380 HSFO: plus 1-4 USD/MT, VLSFO: plus 2-7 USD/MT, MGO LS: plus-minus 5–20 USD/MT.
  Source: MABUX
- 2026-09-08
  Washington’s Venezuela Oil Deal Is About Much More Than Crude
  Washington’s takeover of more than a fifth of Venezuela’s oil reserves in a deal officially signed by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright on 2 September was as unexpected as it was dramatic, with President Donald Trump’s comment a few days earlier that... Read more Washington’s takeover of more than a fifth of Venezuela’s oil reserves in a deal officially signed by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright on 2 September was as unexpected as it was dramatic, with President Donald Trump’s comment a few days earlier that it is “the biggest oil deal in world history” looking justified from several perspectives. From a pure volume standpoint, the deal covers 65 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves (out of Venezuela’s total 303 billion barrels) across 17 fields. To put that in perspective, it is nearly 1.5 times the size of the U.S.’s entire current territorial reserves of around 46 billion barrels. The length of the concession is massive too, with its 100 years dwarfing the typical 20-to-30-year span of modern oil concessions. Moreover, the private entity driving the deal -- North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) has instantly become the second-largest private oil company by reserves in the world (after ExxonMobil), with the U.S. Department of War holding a 35% equity stake. In short, then, locking in a fifth of the world’s largest national oil reserves for a century is unprecedented in the modern era. That said, several key questions remain about the workability of the deal and where it fits into Trump’s global oil market order.
  
  The U.S.’s ‘2025 National Security Strategy’ (NSS) officially put Trump’s second presidency vision of the world, and of its energy market, on paper. It explicitly introduces what it calls ‘The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine’, stating: “After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region.” It adds: “We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere. This ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests.” Back in 1823, when the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ was propounded by U.S. President James Monroe, the aim of the policy was to keep European colonial powers out of the Americas.
  Related: Rosneft Ships First Crude From $157 Billion Vostok Oil Project
  
  This new iteration -- termed the ‘Donroe Doctrine’ -- means a dramatic shift away from a post-Cold War model of global American dominance into a highly transactional, realpolitik vision of a world effectively carved into three distinct spheres of influence. China would hold the primary role in Asia, while Russia would either dominate or significantly influence Europe, depending on how any future conflict between European NATO members and Moscow unfolds. But, at the top, the U.S. would maintain overall dominance around the globe while also exerting direct influence across the Americas (North and South America). Naturally, as energy underpins the economies -- and thus politics -- of every country in the world, shifting the centre of dominance in global energy supplies to the Americas is a core part of that aim, but at the same time the U.S. reserves the right to extend its influence in the Middle East or anywhere else it wants, as it sees fit. The practical consequence of this for global oil flows is that the U.S. aims to orchestrate a dramatic ramping up of oil production not just domestically but across key countries in its Americas sphere of influence -- most notably Venezuela in the short- to medium-term, but also Argentina, and Brazil -- to compensate for losses from the Middle East, as fully examined recently by OilPrice.com.
  
  The broad terms of this huge deal between the U.S. and Venezuela align perfectly with Trump’s vision, with the 31 August White House Fact Sheet echoing many of the same key points. Under the sub-heading ‘Reasserting The Monroe Doctrine & Expelling Foreign Adversaries From Our Hemisphere’, the Fact Sheet states: “The majority of the incremental oil fields to be operated by NABEP were previously controlled or operated by Russian and Chinese firms, or by corrupt cronies of [Nicolás] Maduro and [Hugo] Chavez.” It continues: “These malign foreign actors looted Venezuela’s resources for the benefit of American adversaries like Cuba, Russia and China and failed to invest in Venezuela’s infrastructure or development.” The new deal with Venezuela, it adds, is precisely part of the re-establishment of the Monroe Doctrine, focused on “purging malign influence from our backyard and ensuring American dominance in our hemisphere is never again questioned”. With an eye, perhaps, on future energy security threats resulting from military actions by China -- as happened after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 -- the Fact Sheet concludes: “By working with both new and old partners, President Trump’s Administration is forging new robust, strategic and defensible supply chains in our hemisphere to support the revitalization of our manufacturing and energy sectors after years of globalist decline.”
  
  That said, there are several potential legal pitfalls that could pose problems for the U.S., particularly if a less compliant political leadership begins to emerge in Venezuela. As it stands, there is strict U.S. oversight over every element in the arrangement, including, for example, veto power over NABEP’s board of directors, allied to the fact that U.S. citizens are legally required to hold a majority of the board seats. In tandem with this, the U.S. Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital retains a 35% equity stake in NABEP. Moreover, the U.S. government is guaranteed the right to buy 20% of the pumped crude at cost, with a right of first refusal to purchase the remaining 80%. And funds allocated to Venezuela’s state energy apparatus will move through a U.S.-managed and audited account to prevent domestic corruption. In reality, none of this is out of line with the precedents set by China and Russia in multiple of their ‘co-operation agreements’ with several countries over the years -- most notably, with Iran and Iraq, as analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. However, there are those who portray the deal in colonialist terms.
  
  Perhaps the major legal problem right now is that Venezuela’s constitution requires National Assembly approval for any long?term concessions over strategic national resources. Worse still from this perspective is that the deal was negotiated by an interim government only whose constitutional legitimacy is already contested. Consequently, any future government can argue that as the interim administration lacked authority, the entire agreement should be declared ultra vires (beyond legal powers) and void. In fact, this could be done even without any change in government, as Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) possesses the constitutional mechanisms to challenge, freeze, or entirely invalidate the NABEP concession. Such a challenge could be mounted solely on the basis of the transfer of control over Venezuelan oil reserves to a foreign power, which is also strictly prohibited under the country’s constitution.
  
  Nonetheless, Venezuela’s present interim government, led by President Delcy Rodriguez, appears all in favour of the deal, highlighting that the U.S. targets production of more than 1.5 million bpd from the 17 strategic fields over a 25-year term. This would generate more than US$100 billion in investment and US$209 billion in tax revenue for the Venezuelan state, according to her government’s forecasts. Venezuela's oil production has risen to around 1.21 million bpd, driven by several new initiatives from U.S. and European firms. Following the announcement of the U.S.-Venezuela megadeal, Italy’s Eni signed a strategic contract with Venezuela’s state-owned PDVSA for operatorship of the Junin 5 oil field in the onshore heavy oil Orinoco Basin. Under the terms of the deal, Eni will have full responsibility for the technical, financial, and commercial management of the site, with the field believed to contain around 35 billion barrels of oil in place. Meanwhile, Chevron said it had agreed updated terms for its joint ventures in Venezuela and plans to invest more than US$7 billion over the next five years, targeting production of about 600,000 bpd. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-09-08
  Sudan Could Become the Red Sea’s Next Energy Security Flashpoint
  The investigations published by The New York Times and The Washington Post should not be dismissed as another collection of allegations emerging from Sudan’s opaque civil war. Taken together, they present the most substantial publicly available evidence... Read more The investigations published by The New York Times and The Washington Post should not be dismissed as another collection of allegations emerging from Sudan’s opaque civil war. Taken together, they present the most substantial publicly available evidence yet that elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces developed, stockpiled, and apparently used improvised chlorine weapons. If independently verified, this would transform Sudan’s conflict into a chemical-weapons and energy-security crisis directly connected to the Red Sea.
  
  The material reportedly includes bomb designs, test videos, photographs, and intercepted communications. Specialists found no evidence that key audio-visual material had been digitally manipulated, while intelligence officials, former weapons inspectors and human-rights experts assessed the dossier as credible.
  
  That does not prove every identity, location, date, or operational claim. The dossier provides compelling indications of a probable chlorine-weapons program. Sudan’s military denies developing or using chemical weapons, while Khartoum maintains that American sanctions are politically motivated.
  
  Sudan’s own investigation, however, cannot replace independent verification, especially when allegations threaten regional stability and involve entities inside the committee established to investigate it. The concerns are not entirely new, but they underscore the risk to regional peace and energy security.
  
  The new dossier therefore adds operational detail and possible evidence of concealment to an existing American assessment. For energy markets, the most important aspect is that a suspected attack reportedly occurred near the Al Jaili refinery, north of Khartoum. Energy infrastructure is no longer collateral terrain in Sudan’s war. Refineries, fuel depots, pipelines, electricity networks, and port facilities provide military mobility, government revenue, and political control. The reported use of chlorine to clear forces from an oil facility would create a particularly dangerous precedent: critical energy assets could increasingly become unconventional-warfare targets.
  
  The escalation potential of improvised chlorine munitions should alert external supporters and adversaries alike, emphasizing the need for coordinated efforts to protect energy infrastructure and regional stability.
  
  Sudan’s war has already demonstrated that increasingly sophisticated drones can strike far behind traditional front lines. Electricity systems, fuel installations, and other civilian infrastructure have been attacked alongside military locations. The danger is that chemical-weapons allegations could now be invoked to justify additional strikes against airbases, military-industrial sites, storage areas, and logistics nodes across eastern Sudan.
  
  Port Sudan is consequently the central pressure point for energy security. It is Sudan’s principal commercial harbor, an entry point for imported fuels and humanitarian supplies, an outlet for Sudanese and South Sudanese crude, and the location of strategically important naval infrastructure. It is also indispensable to electricity generation, transport, and the survival of Sudan’s remaining formal economy.
  
  Long-range drone attacks in May 2025 already struck fuel depots, the Southern Port terminal, electricity infrastructure, the airport, and the Flamingo naval base. Future attacks would not need to destroy the port to produce a major disruption. Damage to tank farms, pumping installations, power supplies, loading facilities, or access roads could interrupt fuel imports, delay exports, and force commercial vessels to wait offshore.
  
  South Sudan is especially exposed. As a landlocked producer, it depends on pipelines that cross Sudan and on export infrastructure at Port Sudan. Previous attacks against Heglig, Al Jabalyn and associated facilities demonstrated how rapidly battlefield developments can interrupt production and exports. A prolonged pipeline or terminal shutdown would threaten more than the loss of several hundred thousand barrels per day.
  
  Oil revenues finance most of the South Sudanese state. Their disappearance would undermine its ability to pay civil servants and security forces, import food, and fuel, and manage internal political tensions. Sudan’s instability could thereby trigger a second crisis across the border, placing another oil-producing state at risk of economic and political fragmentation.
  
  Sudan’s domestic energy position is equally precarious. Refining capacity cannot satisfy national demand, while diesel and gasoline imported through Port Sudan support generators, transport, water pumping, hospitals, and agricultural activity. The confrontation around Hormuz has already increased the cost and uncertainty of Gulf-origin fuel supplies, while Red Sea war-risk premiums are raising freight and insurance costs. Parallel-market gasoline prices around Khartoum reportedly increased by almost 67% in one week during April 2026, illustrating how quickly external disruption is transmitted into the Sudanese economy.
  
  The chemical-weapons allegations could worsen these pressures even without renewed attacks. Additional sanctions, cargo inspections, and restrictions on dual-use chemicals could complicate legitimate imports of water-treatment chlorine, refinery components, and industrial equipment. Banks, insurers, and shipping companies could withdraw rather than risk breaching sanctions. Such over-compliance would deepen fuel shortages, electricity outages, and humanitarian distress while doing relatively little to constrain procurement networks operating through informal channels.
  
  Further chemical-weapons allegations could escalate energy security risks by disrupting shipping routes and increasing war-risk premiums across the Red Sea region.
  
  That regional context is critical. Bab el-Mandeb traffic remains depressed, threats and attacks have disrupted Saudi oil movements from Yanbu, and Gulf producers are relying more heavily on Red Sea infrastructure because Hormuz remains severely constrained. Saudi Arabia’s dependence on its East-West Pipeline and Yanbu export facilities has consequently increased sharply. Yet tankers carrying Saudi crude have already changed course rather than sail through Bab el-Mandeb following new security threats.
  
  If Sudan’s coastline becomes another sustained drone theatre, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and international naval forces would face an increasingly challenging task: protecting an energy corridor extending from Yanbu and Port Sudan through Bab el-Mandeb and toward the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, Suez and Hormuz remain exposed at either end of the wider system.
  
  Sudan alone cannot structurally move global oil prices. Its direct oil volumes are too small. The real price risk comes from correlation. If it coincides with restricted Hormuz flows, attacks on Saudi exports, disruption around Suez, or damage to Yanbu, markets will conclude that the alternative routes designed to compensate for Hormuz are themselves becoming unreliable.
  
  The most likely three-month scenario is greater diplomatic pressure, additional sanctions, and renewed demands for OPCW access, but no direct foreign military intervention. The immediate impact on global oil prices would remain modest. A more dangerous scenario would involve attacks against Port Sudan’s fuel storage, pipeline terminal, port facilities, or airbases allegedly connected to the chemical program. South Sudanese exports could be interrupted, Sudanese fuel shortages would intensify, and Red Sea insurance costs would rise.
  
  The real tail risk is simultaneous escalation around Port Sudan, Yanbu, Bab el-Mandeb, and Hormuz. At that point, the oil market would no longer be pricing separate national crises. It would be pricing the progressive militarization of the maritime energy system connecting the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal.
  
  Port Sudan does not need to become another Hormuz to matter. It only needs to become another unreliable link in an energy corridor that is already dangerously overstretched. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-09-08
  Can Iraq Really Replace Saudi Arabia As The Middle East’s Top Oil Producer?
  The global power of most Middle Eastern countries remains dependent on their oil and/or gas output, so it is little wonder they try to maximise this, either by pushing production higher or by pretending it is higher, or by forecasting that it will be... Read more The global power of most Middle Eastern countries remains dependent on their oil and/or gas output, so it is little wonder they try to maximise this, either by pushing production higher or by pretending it is higher, or by forecasting that it will be higher at some point soon. Iraq had historically fallen into the last of these categories -- having periodically promised large increases in oil production that never materialised. Saudi Arabia, the Middle East’s top oil producer, meanwhile, has fallen into the first category -- alluding to oil production ‘capacity’ of 11, 12, or 13 million barrels per day (bpd) at varying times. The facts for Iraq are that its crude oil production averaged 2.38 million bpd from 1973 until 2026. Before the blockade of the world’s major oil transit route began in February, Iraq was producing 4.14 million bpd. Meanwhile, for Saudi Arabia, it has never produced anywhere near its claimed ‘capacity’ for any sustained period that would warrant that definition according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Instead, the Kingdom’s crude oil production averaged 8.29 million bpd from 1973 until 2026. Prior to the Strait of Hormuz blockade, it was producing 10.1 million bpd. That said, the recent announcement by Iraq’s new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi that the country plans to raise oil production to between 8 million and 10 million barrels per day within six years may finally be proven correct for three key reasons and may even allow it to surpass Saudi Arabia as the top oil producer in the region.
  
  First, the country has always had sufficient oil reserves to reach that figure, if handled properly. Officially, according to EIA figures, Iraq holds a very conservatively estimated 145 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves (nearly 18% of the Middle East’s total, and around 9% of the world’s). Unofficially, as analysed in depth in my latest book on the global oil markets, around the same time as producing the official reserves figures, Iraq’s Oil Ministry stated that the country’s undiscovered resources were around 215 billion barrels. This was in line with a 1997 detailed study by respected oil and gas firm Petrolog, although even this number did not include the parts of northern Iraq in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan. As highlighted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), this meant that most of these oil sites had been drilled during a period before the 1970s when technical limits and low oil prices gave a narrower definition of what constituted a commercially successful well than would be the case later. Overall, the IEA underlined that ultimately recoverable resources across all of Iraq (including the Kurdistan region) totalled about 246 billion barrels (crude and natural gas liquids). All these figures fall within the parameters of the government-sponsored report -- the Integrated National Energy Strategy (INES), launched in 2013 -- which formulated the three forward oil production profiles for Iraq. The INES’ best-case scenario was for crude oil production capacity to increase to 13 million bpd (at that point by 2017), peaking at around that level until 2023, and finally gradually declining to around 10 million bpd for a long-sustained period thereafter. The mid-range production scenario was for Iraq to reach 9 million bpd (at that point by 2020), and the worst-case INES scenario was for production to reach 6 million bpd (at that point by 2020). Consequently, the current target of 8 to 10 million bpd looks like a reasonable-case scenario.
  
  Second, towards the latter part of previous Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s stint in office, and continuing under new man Ali al-Zaidi, there has been a drift back towards the idea in Baghdad of accommodating U.S. demands for a reduction in the widespread corrupt practices that saw Western firms exit the country in recent years. As had been meticulously observed and reported on for years by the highly-respected independent non-governmental organisation Transparency International (TI) in its ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, Iraq had for years been: “Among the worst countries on corruption and governance indicators, with corruption risks exacerbated by lack of experience in the public administration, weak capacity to absorb the influx of aid money, sectarian issues and lack of political will for anti-corruption efforts.” TI added: “Massive embezzlement, procurement scams, money laundering, oil smuggling and widespread bureaucratic bribery that have led the country to the bottom of international corruption rankings, fuelled political violence and hampered effective state-building and service delivery.” It concluded: “Political interference in anti-corruption bodies and politicisation of corruption issues, weak civil society, insecurity, lack of resources and incomplete legal provisions severely limit the government’s capacity to efficiently curb soaring corruption.” This mass exodus of precisely those Western firms that had possessed the ideal combination of experienced personnel, high technological capabilities, and cutting-edge equipment to drill oil wells optimally and to build out the wide-ranging infrastructure that was essential to Iraq making significant output gains over time was catastrophic for the country. However, as corruption has broadly declined in the West’s dealings with Iraq, in tandem with new sanctions imposed by Washington on Baghdad for aiding Iran over the years -- in ways examined in my latest book on the global oil markets -- several of these key firms have returned.
  
  Third -- and the most important of these from the combined perspective of oil and gas field development and from key infrastructure construction -- is French supermajor TotalEnergies’ US$27-billion four-pronged mega-project finally ratified in 2023. One part of the project will dramatically increase the amount of gas captured during the process of drilling for oil (‘associated gas’). This, in turn, will reduce the amount of oil that Iraq has to use for domestic power generation, freeing up more of it for export, and part of the proceeds from this can go back into field development. Another part will increase production from the Ratawi oil field from roughly 60,000 bpd to 120,000 bpd in its initial execution phase, with an ultimate developmental target of 210,000 bpd. This will also demonstrate to the Iraqis how a much higher recovery rate can be achieved across its other fields. And finally, the key to it all: the stabilisation and then boosting of pressure at Iraq’s biggest oil fields through the treatment and redirection of seawater to these sites through the ‘Common Seawater Supply Project’ (CSSP), as also fully detailed in my latest book.
  
  Given these factors, the chance of Iraq hitting its latest (8-10 million bpd) production target looks to have risen significantly. A back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on just the super-giant fields and their original individual peak plateau targets in their Technical Service Contracts, shows around 11.5 million bpd in oil production. This comprises Rumaila at 2.1 million bpd, West Qurna 2 at 1.8 million bpd, West Qurna 1 at 1.6 million bpd, Majnoon at 1.8 million bpd, Zubair at 1.2 million bpd, the Kirkuk (Federal Domes) at 1 million bpd, and Halfaya, East Baghdad, Garraf, and Badra at 2 million bpd combined. These peak plateau targets assumed a functioning CSSP, adequate sustained investment, and the most technologically advanced oil firms leading the projects. Importantly, this 11.5 million bpd figure does not include any of the other 115 oil fields in Iraq, nor does it include any of the fields in the north of the country that are administered by the semi-autonomous regional government there. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-09-08
  India Ramps Up Rail Coal Deliveries as Power Plant Stockpiles Dwindle
  Indian coal companies are ramping up supply to the coal-fired power plants as coal stocks at dozens of the plants dropped to critically low levels, India’s Ministry of Coal said on Monday. More than 50 coal-fired power plants in India, where coal is... Read more Indian coal companies are ramping up supply to the coal-fired power plants as coal stocks at dozens of the plants dropped to critically low levels, India’s Ministry of Coal said on Monday.
  
  More than 50 coal-fired power plants in India, where coal is still the single largest electricity generator, saw their coal stocks fall below the critically low level of 25% as electricity demand rises amid the strong El Niño, but supply has been disrupted by monsoon rains.
  
  The number of power plants with critically low coal stocks rose to 53 as of September 5, from 45 on August 26, the latest data by the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) showed.
  
  Coal shipments via rail to power plants have increased in recent days, the Coal Ministry said today. The rise “reflects the sustained efforts of Coal India Limited (CIL), its subsidiaries, SCCL and captive mine operators to ramp up coal supply to the power sector,” the ministry added.
  
  “The number of critical thermal plants (stock below 25% of normative requirement) are being closely monitored, with corrective coal supply measures already in place to further ease the position at these plants,” the ministry noted.
  
  The Ministry of Coal and state-owned Coal India Limited, the world’s biggest coal miner, “remain committed to sustaining this improving trend in rake loading to the power sector and meeting the requirements,” India said.
  
  In August, monsoon-related disruptions to domestic supply tightened the immediate availability and transportation of coal from the coal-rich producing states to the coal-fired power plants.
  
  Stocks at India’s power plants declined by 15.5% between August 1 and 23, as receipts of coal deliveries lagged the rate of coal burns, commodity consultancy BigMint said last month.
  
  The monsoon season in India has been disrupted by El Niño, with hotter-than-usual temperatures driving up power demand. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-09-08
  American and African Crudes Soar as China's Oil Imports Rebound
  The prices of crudes from Canada, South America, and Africa have jumped in recent weeks as Chinese oil import demand is rising from a decade-low, benchmark prices rally, and Middle East supply remains disrupted. The Djeno crude from Congo, one of the... Read more The prices of crudes from Canada, South America, and Africa have jumped in recent weeks as Chinese oil import demand is rising from a decade-low, benchmark prices rally, and Middle East supply remains disrupted.
  
  The Djeno crude from Congo, one of the smaller producers in OPEC, is being offered at a premium of $20 per barrel over ICE Brent, anonymous traders told Bloomberg on Monday. That's up from a $15 a barrel premium two weeks ago, according to the traders.
  
  The prices of crudes from Canada, Brazil, and Argentina are also rising amid increased appetite in Asia.
  
  Asian crude oil importers, including China, Japan, and South Korea, have turned to buying oil from as far as Argentina to offset supply losses from the Middle East.
  
  In recent weeks, refiners in Asia have bought Argentina's Medanito crude, and at least one cargo of the oil comparable to the U.S. West Texas Intermediate loaded in August, anonymous traders with knowledge of the purchases told Bloomberg last week.
  
  China, in particular, is boosting imports of African and American grades, as well as of its favorite ESPO blend from Russia, as Iranian crude supply has rapidly dried up in recent weeks following the re-imposed U.S. blockade on Iran's oil exports.
  
  The world's top crude oil importer, China, has seen its crude imports rebound from the decade-low level in June as Beijing eased fuel export restrictions and refiners moved to restock and capture fairly decent refining margins.
  
  Yet, Chinese crude oil imports, estimated at about 7.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in August, remain well-below the pre-war levels of 11-12 million bpd, suggesting that China would remain selective in crude purchases amid volatile and often spiking oil prices. Beijing can still afford to be selective as it had amassed an estimated 1.4 billion barrels of crude in commercial and strategic storage before the Iran war began.
  
  Currently, the biggest losers in China's refining industry are the small independent refiners who had relied for years on dirt-cheap Iranian and Venezuelan crude. Now one is not flowing out of the Persian Gulf, the other is not so cheap anymore. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-09-08
  High Crude and LNG Prices Weigh on India’s Oil and Gas Sector
  The renewed rally in crude oil and LNG prices and the higher freight costs are pressuring the marketing margins of India’s oil and gas sector, which has to contend with the fallout of the Iran war on global oil and LNG trade flows. Increased refining... Read more The renewed rally in crude oil and LNG prices and the higher freight costs are pressuring the marketing margins of India’s oil and gas sector, which has to contend with the fallout of the Iran war on global oil and LNG trade flows.
  
  Increased refining margins offset some of the downward pressure, but gasoline and diesel marketing margins remain negative, while high LNG prices in Asia would squeeze margins in the gas sector and likely lead to softer September imports of LNG, India-based brokerage Equirus said a note carried by local media.
  
  Amid uncertainty about LNG supply from the Middle East and intensifying competition between Europe and Asia for winter gas supply, Asia’s spot LNG price surged last week to the highest level since 2022. That’s 61% higher from a year earlier and a 22% increase in the past three months.
  
  As a result, India’s LNG imports are likely to trend down this month from strong arrivals in August, according to Equirus.
  
  The higher LNG prices are pressuring the big gas consumers in India, as their costs remain very high.
  
  Meanwhile, India’s crude oil import bill has soared in recent months, due to the reduced oil flows from the Middle East and the high risks to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
  
  The freight rates on the key route from Ras Tanura on Saudi Arabia’s Persian Gulf to India have soared by more than 400% since February 28, when the war began, and Iran closed off the Strait of Hormuz.
  
  India paid 60% more for crude oil imports in the April-June quarter compared to the same period last year, as the surge in oil prices couldn’t offset slightly lower import volumes.
  
  The rise continued into the beginning of the third quarter, with the July import bill 41% higher from a year earlier. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-09-08
  Saudi Aramco's Jizan Refinery Hit Again as Houthi Attacks Escalate
  Saudi Aramco's 400,000-barrel-per-day Jizan refinery was hit in a new attack Monday, threatening a major Red Sea refining hub while Saudi Arabia is moving more oil west to avoid the Strait of Hormuz. The Financial Times reported that the facilities... Read more Saudi Aramco's 400,000-barrel-per-day Jizan refinery was hit in a new attack Monday, threatening a major Red Sea refining hub while Saudi Arabia is moving more oil west to avoid the Strait of Hormuz.
  
  The Financial Times reported that the facilities in southwestern Saudi Arabia were hit Monday, citing two people with knowledge of the incident. One described the strike as similar in scale to an attack last month that temporarily disrupted operations. Aramco has not yet commented on the latest damage, and no group has been confirmed as responsible.
  
  Jizan has become a repeated target since fighting between Saudi Arabia and Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis resumed this summer. The Houthis attacked Aramco facilities in Jizan and Yanbu in July, when smoke was visible over the refinery, and struck Jizan again in August.
  
  The refinery's location on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast has become increasingly important since the war with Iran disrupted exports through Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has pushed more crude west through its East West pipeline toward Yanbu, even as operations at Jizan have suffered: the Financial Times reported that oil shipments from the refinery have fallen sharply since the previous attack, with no exports recorded in August. Houthi attacks have also threatened tankers and other oil infrastructure along the kingdom's alternative Red Sea export route.
  
  Aramco chief executive Amin Nasser said last month that the earlier attacks caused temporary interruptions but had no material operational or financial impact on the company.
  
  Oil prices were already climbing Monday after Iran proposed a new shipping corridor through Hormuz that Tehran says it would control, in addition to a restricted maritime zone requiring vessels to coordinate with Iran. The proposal followed a weekend of attacks at sea in which U.S. forces struck three Iranian oil tankers after Iran fired ballistic missiles at two U.S. warships. Brent was trading above $97 per barrel Monday. Source: Oilprice.com

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